FAQ

Why signatures from EOAs are rejected even if they are valid?

TargetBase is built for smart account–based execution, not direct EOA calls. All protected functions must be executed via a DelegatedAccount that has been pre-approved. This creates an enforcement layer where EOAs cannot bypass authorization logic.

What happens if someone tries to reuse the same signed authorization twice?

They can’t. TargetBase prevents this via dual-layer replay protection:

1. Nonce Check — must match nonces[msg.sender]

2. Authorization Hash Tracking — once a signature hash is used, it’s permanently recorded and rejected on future calls

This means even if an attacker copies calldata across chains, it still won’t execute.

Can I rotate the master key without breaking existing signatures?

Yes. When rotating the master key, all future authorizations must be signed with the new key, but already-executed signatures remain final. Pending signatures signed by the old key become invalid, this is intentional for security. This means that you also need to create a new attestor image which includes the private key of the latest master key.

Does the contract owner have god mode? Can they bypass requireAuth?

No. TargetBase does not implicitly grant owner privileges over normal functionality. The owner only controls:

• Master key rotation

• Recovery key update

• Emergency nonce reset

Actual business logic must still pass through requireAuth.